A novel bargaining based incentive protocol for opportunistic networks
Yun Li, Jihong Yu, Chonggang Wang, Qilie Liu, Bin Qian Cao, Mahmoud Daneshmand · 2012
Opportunistic networks are the emerging networks featured by partitions, long disconnections, and topology instability, where the message propagation depends on the cooperation of nodes to fulfill a “store-carry-and-forward” fashion. But due to constrained energy and buffer, some nodes may behave selfishly, which will involve damage to the existing routing approaches and seriously degrade the performance of opportunistic networks. Aiming at the above problem, this paper proposes a novel bargaining based incentive protocol (BIP) for opportunistic networks, which exploits two-person bargaining model and allows a node to pay and charge according to its state and the attributes of messages. In addition, the proposed BIP protocol can tackle the issue of blind cooperation when the resources are very scarce. Extensive simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness and the practicality of the proposed BIP protocol in terms of high delivery ratio, low energy consumption and small average delay.