An implementation of Eisner v. Macomber
L. Thorne McCarty · 1995
Eisner v. Macomber , 252 U.S. 189 (1920), a corporate tax case, was the principal illustration of a theory of legal reasoning and legal argumentation proposed more than ten years ago. Although the theory was described in some detail, using the vocabulary of prototypes and deformations, it was never fully implemented. There were two main problems: (1) the knowledge represen- tation languages available at the time were not suf- ciently expressive, and (2) as a result, the central concept of a prototype was never suciently formal- ized. These problems have been remedied by subse- quent work, and the present paper describes an im- plementation (in PROLOG) of the original theory. A study of the implemented system provides a rational reconstruction of the arguments of Justice Pitney and Justice Brandeis in this seminal corporate tax case.