Critique of the reflexive-referential analysis of phenomenal knowledge
Miljana Milojević · Theoria Beograd · 2009
The main concern of this paper is John Perry's attempt to analyze phenomenal knowledge in a way that avoids the objection which states that the non-deducibility of this kind of knowledge leads to the ontological conclusion that physicalism must be false. The attempt in question determines the content of phenomenal knowledge with a help of the reflexive-referential semantic theory which enables us to explain a growth in knowledge without introducing new (non-physical) facts on the subject matter level as the object of this new knowledge. I will argue that even on the assumption that the case of phenomenal knowledge is just another case of recognition knowledge, as Perry argues, the end result of the analysis suffers from unavoidable inconsistencies and the given analysis of the content of phenomenal knowledge proves to be incompatible with the basic assumptions of the central argumentation.