The entailment-presupposition relationship.
Mitchell I. Ginsberg · Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic · 1972
Interest in entailment and presupposition and in their relationship has recently been shown not only in philosophical writings, 1 but also in much recent work in theoretical linguistics.2 The notion of entailment has been introduced in the literature (in the literatures) both by example and by the presentation of an analysis which putatively captures the notion expressed in the examples given.Many recent attempts to determine the relationship between entailment and presupposition have relied on this analysis of entailment, and what I will propose is that we are in need of a new analysis of this notion.Before weighing the case too heavily in any direction, let me at this point, pre-theoretically, introduce what I take to be rather clear and noncontroversial examples of entailment.We will then try to fit the analysis to this body rather than attempt to girdle this body into some preselected analysis (as I believe is necessary with the old treatment of 1. E.g., J. L. Austin, "Performative-Constative," originally in French as "Performatif-Constatif," in La Philosophie