DES-GENERATED CHECKSUMS FOR ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
DR. CHRISTIAN MUELLER-SCHLOER · Cryptologia · 1983
Secrecy and authentication are two important features of a secure communication system. Public Key Cryptosystems, based, e.g., on the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm, provide a very elegant solution to the problem of authenticity verification or true electronic signatures. Practical problems, however, mainly the lack of execution speed, prevent a straightforward application. In order to sign a long message it is much faster to first calculate a short digest or checksum and then sign the compressed message. For this checksum calculation the fast, inexpensive and extensively tested Data Encryption Standard (DES) can be used. But care must be taken that this additional processing step does not introduce any weakness into the signature scheme. This paper investigates two DES-based hashing methods. It is shown that neither method seems to introduce any statistical regularities in the generated checksums. The “Cipher/Message to Plain Feedback,” however, is not secure under a modification compensation attack. It is further shown how the second method, the “Cipher to Plain Feedback” proposed by Davies and Price, can be broken by a “meet in the middle attack.” This checksum method, however, can be used safely with a slight modification.