Sharing Design Rights: A Commons Approach for Developing Infrastructure
Nuno A. Gil, Carliss Y. Baldwin · Academy of Management Proceedings · 2014
This study empirically investigates the relationship between design structure and organization structure in the context of new infrastructure development projects. Our research setting is a capital program to develop new school buildings in the city of Manchester, UK. Instead of creating a controlled, hierarchical organization, which would mirror the buildings’ design structure, the Manchester City Council created a “commons organization”. Each school’s faculty was thus given rights equal to Council staff to participate in the design process and to approve the school’s design. In the natural resources literature, commons theory predicts that, if a robust governance structure is created, this complex form of organizing gives claimants incentives to contribute to the enterprise whilst dampening collective action problems (Ostrom 1990). Here we extend this claim to the production of man-made artifacts. The design commons induced teachers to volunteer time and effort to communicate their practical knowledge, but created corresponding tensions over interdependent choices for the final design. Yet, none of the projects succumbed to collective action problems in the form of budget overruns, bogged-down processes, or users feeling disenfranchised. We show that the Manchester design commons organization was robust by Ostrom’s (1990) principles of robust commons governance and propose that robustness contributed positively to the outcome. We conclude with the rudiments of a theory describing when and why a commons organization can be advantageous for production of designs.