Formalizing the Effect of Feistel Cipher Structures on Differential Cache Attacks
Chester Rebeiro, Phuong Ha Nguyen, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, Axel Y. Poschmann · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · 2013
The success of a side-channel attack depends mainly on three factors, namely, the cipher algorithm, the attack platform, and the measurement noise. In this paper, we consider a class of side-channel attacks known as differential cache attacks on Feistel ciphers, and develop a theoretical framework to understand the relationship between the attack's success, the target platform, and the cipher algorithm. The framework allows a comparison of various differential cache attack forms, and is supported by case studies on the block ciphers CLEFIA and CAMELLIA. To understand the effect of noise in the attack's success, the paper uses empirical methods on standard Intel platforms in a time driven side-channel analysis scenario.