Effect of finite detector efficiencies on the security evaluation of quantum key distribution
Marcos Curty, Norbert Lütkenhaus · Physical Review A · 2004
Quantum key distribution with the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol has been shown to be unconditionally secure even using weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon signals. The distances that can be covered by these methods are limited due to the loss in the quantum channel (e.g., loss in the optical fiber) and in the single-photon counters of the receivers. One can argue that the loss in the detectors cannot be changed by an eavesdropper in order to increase the covered distance. Here we show that the security analysis of this scenario is not as easy as is commonly assumed, since already two-photon processes allow eavesdropping strategies that outperform the known photon-number splitting attack. For this reason there is, so far, no satisfactory security analysis available in the framework of individual attacks.