A DPA/DEMA/LEMA-resistant AES cryptographic processor with supply-current equalizer and micro EM probe sensor
Daisuke Fujimoto, Noriyuki Miura, Yu‐ichi Hayashi, Naofumi Homma, Takafumi Aoki, Makoto Nagata · 2015
Combination of a supply-current equalizer (EQ) and a micro EM probe sensor (EMS) exhibits strong resiliency against major three DPA/DEMA/LEMA low-cost side-channel attacks on a cryptographic processor. Test-chip measurements with 128bit AES cryptographic processor in 0.18μm CMOS successfully demonstrate the secret key protection from all three attacks. A digital-oriented circuit implementation together with a careful design optimization minimize the hardware overhead of EQ and EMS to +33%, +1.6% in area, +7.6%, +0.15% in power, and ~0%, -0.2% in performance of an unprotected AES, respectively.