A cryptanalysis procedure of the data encryption standard
Víctor M. Silva G. · Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE · 2005
In this paper an attack strategy on the Data Encryption Standard (DES) that is different from the existing ones is developed. The attack strategy is based on a theorem proved by the author, called LR theorem. The attack can be done by means of a personal computer, i.e. a Pentium IV based machine. Obviously, more information than a sample of plaintext and ciphertext is required. However, this additional requirement is reduced to a minimum of just 24 bits. The LR theorem uncovers 16 trapdoors of which 2 are of importance. With this knowledge, an attack on Triple-DES can be performed using the aforementioned personal computer. A simple solution to this kind of attack is proposed, preserving the complexity of the Triple-DES, 2112.