“To want to prove it … is … really superfluous”: Friedrich Schlegel's reiterative repudiation of demonstrative rhetoric in theAthenäum fragment#82
William D. Fusfield · Quarterly Journal of Speech · 1997
This essay argues that nineteenth century “declarative” or “reiterative” rhetoric derives theoretical authorization from the eighty‐second Athenäum Fragment of Friedrich Schlegel. An analysis of the content and rhetorical structure of Schlegel's polemical and reiterative rejection of “philosophical and scientific demonstration” is provided. Although such rhetoric is conspicuously deficient by canonical rhetorical standards, it nevertheless retains substantial persuasive force. The rhetorical efficacy of reiterative rhetoric derives from its ability to increase the likelihood of persuasive uptake, its transformation of the relation between author and reader, and its stimulation of the reader's argumentative powers. The relevance of Schlegel's attack on demonstration to recent attempts to rehabilitate sophistic rhetorical theory and declarative rhetoric is then discussed.