Precisification by means of vague predicates.
ROY A. SORENSEN · Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic · 1988
My main theses are that (a) it is impossible for all of language to be vague, and (b) some precise predicates can be defined in terms of vague predicates.These propositions are the negations of two used by Bertrand Russell to criticize the suggestion that the problems posed by vague predicates can be solved by precisifying definitions.After reviewing this criticism, I argue for (a) in the second section and (b) in the third.The next section examines the impact of (b) on current theories of vagueness.I argue that while it is bad news for the manyvalued approach and the view that vague predicates are incoherent, it is good news for the supervaluational and epistemic theories of vagueness.In the last section I show that RusselΓs criticism fails for a reason that strengthens Patrick Grim's more recent attack on precisificationism.So I ultimately come to share RusselΓs pessimism about solving the sorites through precisification. / RusselVs criticism of precisificationismEveryone agrees that the source of sorites puzzles, such as the following, lies in the vagueness of the inductive predicate.