Security on the move
Armando Fox, Steven D. Gribble · 1996
Even as mobile computing and network computing are gaining momentum, Internet security is sharing the spotlight. Security and authentication on open networks is difficult even without the additional risks posed by wireless media. At the same time, the hardware and software constraints imposed by “small” mobile devices such as PDA’s and smart phones are leading to the pervasive use of application-level proxies to mediate between clients and servers. To date, less attention has been focused specifically on securing the connection between the client and an application-level proxy, independently of any particular service. We describe how to provide secure access to application-level proxied services using an indirect protocol called Charon, which leverages the strong protocol and deployed infrastructure of Kerberos IV. Charon partitions the Kerberos client functionality into a very simple client module that does little more than DES encryption, and a Unix-hosted unprivileged proxy module that runs the remainder of the Kerberos client protocol and can interoperate with other proxy code that provides application-level proxy services. The client module is extremely lightweight and amenable to implementation even on the most modest PDA-class devices. The proxy is trusted as much as any other Kerberized service, but it never learns the user’s Kerberos password or ticketgranting service session key. As a result of this partitioning, clients can continue to enjoy the benefits of proxy-mediated access in a secure way, in addition to gaining secure access to and interoperability with existing Kerberized services.