Thwarting Scan-Based Attacks on Secure-ICs With On-Chip Comparison
Jean Joaquim da Rolt, Giorgio Di Natale, Marie-Lise Flottes, Bruno Rouzeyre · IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems · 2014
Hardware implementation of cryptographic algorithms is subject to various attacks. It has been previously demonstrated that scan chains introduced for hardware testability open a back door to potential attacks. Here, we propose a scan-protection scheme that provides testing facilities both at production time and over the course of the circuit's life. The underlying principles to scan-in both input vectors and expected responses and to compare expected and actual responses within the circuit. Compared to regular scan tests, this technique has no impact on the quality of the test or the model-based fault diagnosis. It entails negligible area overhead and avoids the use of an authentication test mechanism.