A Fast and Secure Method to Preserve Anonymity in Electronic Voting
Hyung-Kyu Yang · 한국인터넷방송통신학회 논문지 · 2014
Abstract Mix network plays a key role in electronic voting to preserve anonymity and lots of mixnet schemes have been proposed so far. However, they requires complex and costly zero-knowledge proofs to provide their correct mixing operations. In 2010, Sebe et al. proposed an efficient and lightweight mixnet scheme based on a cryptographic secure hash function instead of zero-knowledge proofs. In this paper, we present a more efficient and faster mixnet scheme than Sebe et al.'s scheme under the same assumption. Also, our scheme is secure. Key Words : Zero-knowledge proof, e-Voting, Anonimity, Mixnet, hash function Ⅰ. Introduction Mixes are a means of untraceable communication based on a public key cryptosystem, as published by D.Chaum in 1981 [1] . A mix-network or mixnet accepts as input a collection of ciphertexts, and outputs associated plaintexts(or ciphertexts) in a randomly permuted order. A well constructed mixnet makes it infeasible for an adversary to determine which plaintext output corresponds to which ciphertext input more efficiently than by guessing at random. Proposed by D.Chaum in 1981 as a technique for anonymous e-mail and e-voting, mixnet can be categorized into decryption mix-nets and re-encryption mix-nets