The Dependency of Discretion and Consistency on Knowledge Representation
Andrew M. Stranieri, John L. Yearwood, Tunde Meikle · International Review of Law Computers & Technology · 2000
In this paper we have argued that discretion manifests differently in different representations of knowledge. Knowledge representations that are equivalent to a first-order logic formalization are only able to model strong discretion if they are allowed repeated revision of the world that they describe. Higher order representations such as the variations of the Toulmin argument structure described here are able to support and model both weak and strong discretion. It is further argued that consistency also varies in the way it is captured by these levels of knowledge representation. With first-order logical formalisms leading to a specific limited concept of consistency, and higher order representations making consistency an increasingly vague concept. We argue against any unitary view of consistency and suggest it is most usefully defined as an operational concept within a specific practical domain. We also propose that discretion and consistency are not related in any simple and direct fashion, other than in very discrete and precise domains, of which there are few in law. The general notion that discretion necessarily results in inconsistency is challenged. We have argued that the relationship between discretion and consistency will depend on the knowledge representation chosen and appears to be dependent on the specific practical domain being considered.