Rational secret sharing eliminating incredible threat in standard communication network
Sun Fuling, Zhou Zhanfei · 2012
In this paper, we propose an efficient rational secret sharing protocol, which relies on synchronous channel. Most importantly, in our protocol incredible threat is eliminated and reach k-resilient sequential equilibrium (k<;m). Previous protocol used aborting as punishment to violator, but it is incredible because of the sequence of players' behavior. Moreover, the previous definition of incredible threat cannot serve its role well to explain the problem we encounter in rational secret sharing. Therefore, we propose our definition of incredible threat, which is more reasonable and we prove that why aborting as a way of punishment is not credible. Besides of efficiency of our protocol, compared to [15], our protocol can prevent m-1 players coalition, and our share size is O(k')(k' is security parameter). In the share renewal stage, we use the enrollment protocol, so our protocol is efficient in commitment and we only need to care about the total number without any participation requirement for a particular player set like [19].