An Achilles Heel in Signature-Based IDS : Squealing False Positives in SNORT
Samuel T. Patton · 2001
We report a vulnerability to network signature-based IDS which we have tested using Snort and we call “Squealing”. This vulnerability has significant implications since it can easily be generalized to any IDS. The vulnerability of signature-based IDS to high false positive rates has been welldocumented but we go further to show (at a high level) how packets can be crafted to match attack signatures such that a alarms on a target IDS can be conditioned or disabled and then exploited. This is the first academic treatment of this vulnerability that has already been reported to the CERT Coordination Center and the National Infrastructure Protection Center. Independently, other tools based on “squealing” are poised to appear that, while validating our ideas, also gives cause for concern. keywords: squealing, false positive, intrusion detection, IDS, signature-based, misuse behavior, network intrusion detection, snort