DATA SEMANTICS AND THE PRAGMATICS OF INDICATIVE CONDITIONALS
Frank Veltman · Cambridge University Press eBooks · 1986
Editors' note . This chapter proposes a clear criterion for a demarcation between the semantics and pragmatics of indicative conditionals, based on a dynamic logic known as data semantics and a relative notion of truth (for which it is criticized by Adams). Gricean maxims are given a central explanatory role in accounting for conditionals. As a model for information processing, data semantics shows similarities to Situation Semantics (see the chapters by Barwise and ter Meulen). Discussion of the interaction between modals and conditionals is also to be found in Greenberg's contribution. INTRODUCTION Some arguments are logically valid but pragmatically incorrect. Others are pragmatically correct but logically invalid. Grice's Logic and conversation (1975) taught us to draw these distinctions, but unfortunately most of us draw them differently. What one calls a logically valid argument form with a few pragmatically incorrect instances is for another a logically invalid argument form with many pragmatically correct instances. For example, if you believe that indicative conditionals behave like material or strict implications, you will be ready to point out that the intuitively absurd argument. (1) If Jones wins the election, Smith will retire to private life If Smith dies before the election, Jones will win it ∴ If Smith dies before the election, he will retire to private life is just a pragmatically incorrect instance of the logically valid Hypothetical Syllogism: (2) If B then C If A then B ∴ If A then C