Lyapunov Based Frugal Incentive Mechanism for Periodical Mobile Crowdsensing
Jiajun Sun · arXiv (Cornell University) · 2015
Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) has been intensively explored recently due to its flexible and pervasive sensing ability. Although many incentive mechanisms have been built to attract extensive user participation, Most of these mechanisms focus only on independent task scenarios, where the sensing tasks are independent of each other. On the contrary, we focus on a periodical task scenario, where each user participates in the same type of sensing tasks periodically. In this work, we consider the frugal payment problem in a general time-dependent and location-aware periodical MCS system, taking the long-term user participation incentive into explicit consideration. We study the problem systematically under both semi-online (the intra-period interactive process is synchronous while the inter-period interactive process is sequential and asynchronous during each period) and online user arrival models (the previous two interactive processes are sequential and asynchronous). In particular, we first propose a Lyapunov-based semi-online frugal incentive mechanism, which converges asymptotically to the optimal benchmark performance. Moreover, we also present Lyapunov-based online frugal incentive mechanism, which satisfies the constant frugality. Besides, the two mechanisms can also satisfy computational efficiency, individual rationality and truthfulness. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the theoretical properties of our online mechanisms.