FPGA Implementations of the AES Masked Against Power Analysis Attacks
Francesco Regazzoni, Yi Wang, François‐Xavier Standaert · 2011
Abstract. Power analysis attacks are a serious treat for implementations of mod-ern cryptographic algorithms. Masking is a particularly appealing countermea-sure against such attacks since it increases the security to a well quantifiable level and can be implemented without modifying the underlying technology. Its main drawback is the performance overhead it implies. For example, due to pro-hibitive memory costs, the straightforward application of masking to the AES algorithm, with precomputed tables, is hardly practical. In this paper, we exploit both the increased size of state-of-the-art reconfigurable hardware devices and previous optimization techniques to minimize the memory occupation of soft-ware S-boxes, in order to provide an efficient FPGA implementation of the AES algorithm, masked against side-channel attacks. We describe two high throughput architectures, based on 32-bit and 128-bit datapaths that are suitable for Xilinx Virtex-5 devices. In this way, we demonstrate the possibility to efficiently com-bine technological advances with algorithmic optimizations in this context. 1