A Truthful Geographic Forwarding Algorithm for Ad-hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes
Yongwei Wang, Venkata C. Giruka, Mukesh Kumar Singhal · 2007
Geographic routing algorithms for ad-hoc networks exhibit better scalability compared to topology-based routing algorithms. However, geographic routing algorithms assume a cooperative network setting for ad-hoc networks. In this paper, we present TGF, a truthful geographic forwarding algorithm for ad-hoc networks that consist of selfish nodes. These selfish nodes forward data packets from other nodes, if they get enough payment to cover their individual forwarding cost. TGF stimulates node cooperation by using the concept of virtual money and prevents nodes from cheating over their cost. We introduce three auction schemes for forwarding packets to a next hop. In all schemes the next hop node is typically the winner of the auction. We show that TGF is a truthful geographic forwarding algorithm −an algorithm is truthful if it maximizes the utility of nodes only when they bid or claim their true cost. Furthermore, we show the effectiveness of TGF via extensive simulations under various network scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, TGF is the first truthful geographic forwarding algorithm for ad-hoc networks. Keywords: Ad-hoc networks, geographic forwarding, nodes cooperation, selfish nodes, truthfulness 1