Exploiting redundancy in natural language to penetrate Bayesian spam filters
Christoph Karlberger, Günther Bayler, Christopher Kruegel, Engin Kirda · 2007
Today’s attacks against Bayesian spam filters attempt to keep the content of spam mails visible to humans, but obscured to filters. A common technique is to fool filters by appending additional words to a spam mail. Because these words appear very rarely in spam mails, filters are inclined to classify the mail as legitimate. The idea we present in this paper leverages the fact that natural language typically contains synonyms. Synonyms are different words that describe similar terms and concepts. Such words often have significantly different spam probabilities. Thus, an attacker might be able to penetrate Bayesian filters by replacing suspicious words by innocuous terms with the same meaning. A precondition for the success of such an attack is that Bayesian spam filters of different users assign similar spam probabilities to similar tokens. We first examine whether this precondition is met; afterwards, we measure the effectivity of an automated substitution attack by creating a test set of spam messages that are tested against SpamAssassin, DSPAM, and Gmail.