Knowledge and the frame problem
Leora Morgenstern · 1991
The frame problem, which arises in any reasonably expressive theory of action, shows up in a strengthened form in integrated theories of knowledge and action. In this paper, we present two instances of this strengthened frame problem: the Third Agent Frame Problem and the Vicarious Agent Frame Problem. We show that these problems cannot be solved at all by using frame axioms, and that most non-monotonic temporal logics are likewise inadequate for handling these problems. Finally, we show how an existing non-monotonic temporal logic, Motivated Action Theory, can be extended to handle both problems. 2 Introduction It has long been recognized that agents who operate in complex environments must be able to reason about the interactions between knowledge and action ([McCarthy and Hayes, 1969], [Moore, 1980], [Konolige, 1982]). Agents must reason about the knowledge they need in order to perform an action, how actions that they perform affect their knowledge, and how they can plan to achiev...