A calculus for security boots trapping in distributed systems*
Ueli M. Maurer, Pierre Schmid · Journal of Computer Security · 1996
A calculus of channel security properties is presented which allows the analysis and comparison of protocols for establishing secure channels in a distributed open system at a high level of abstraction. A channel is characterized by its direction, its time of availability and its security propertie s. Cryptographic primitives as well as trust relations are interpreted as transformations for channel security properties, and a cryptographic protocol can be viewed as a sequence of such transformations. A protocol thus allows to transform a set of secure channels established during an initial setup phase, together with a set of insecure channels available during operation of the system, into the set of secure channels specified by the security requirements. The necessary and sufficient requirements for establishing a secure channel between two entities A and B are characterized in terms of secure channels to be made available during the initial setup phase and in terms of the minimal trust A and B must have into other entities or into trusted third parties.