Characterization of the Information Leakage of Cryptographic Devices by Using EM Anal
Olivier Meynard, Sylvain Guilley, Jean‐Luc Danger, Yu‐ichi Hayashi, Naofumi Homm · InTech eBooks · 2012
Cryptographic modules (software or hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms) are widely used in our daily life in different applications in order to secure digital transactions and exchanges. In particular, cryptographic hardware is essential in smartcards, identification systems, mobile phones, pay television set-top boxes, transportation services and so on. This hardware component embeds cryptographic algorithms that are deemed safer and unbreakable from a mathematical point of view, and thus increases the confidence and robustness of cryptographic functions. However, the hardware implementation is still vulnerable to physical attacks. Side Channel Analysis (SCA) is a major threat for crypto-systems as they disclose some information about the internal process and the sensitive data. An electronic circuit needs some time to produce its results (such as a ciphertext in the case of encryption) and an amount of energy to switch states at each clock period. The operating times, the power dissipation, or the electromagnetic radiations are directly modulated by the data that are processed. Consequently the cryptographic device leaks some clues about the inner secrets and an attacker can retrieve secrets computed by the cryptographic device, just by analysing these externally measurable quantities without touching the component. Thus, those unintentional physical emanations can be analysed in a view to derive some sensitive information from them. Such analyses are altogether referred to as Side-Channel Attacks.