Receipt-freeness in Large-scale Elections without Untappable Channels
Emmanouil Magkos, Mike V. D. Burmester, Vassilis Chrissikopoulos · Kluwer Academic Publishers eBooks · 2005
For an electronic election to be fully democratic there is a need for security mechanisms that will assure the privacy of the voters. With receipt-free electronic voting, a voter neither obtains nor is able to construct a receipt proving the content of her vote. In this paper we first consider the minimal requirements for receipt-free elections, without untappable communication channels between the voter and the voting authorities. We then propose a solution, which satisfies these requirements. This solution is based on an encryption blackbox, which uses its own randomness. Finally we present an implementation with smartcards, suitable for Internet voting. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.