On the relation between truth maintenance and autoepistemic logic
Michael Reinfrank, Oskar Dressier, Gerd Brewka · 1989
In a recent paper, Konolige has introduced a new version of autoepistemic logic (AEL), which is based on a strong notion of groundedness. We show that it is well-suited for formalizing the concept of justified belief in a non-monotonic truth maintenance system (TMS). If we consider the justifications of a TMS as formulae of the form it computes the set of non-modal atoms of a strongly grounded AEL-extension. It is shown that a variant of Dressler's encoding of nonmonotonic justifications in an assumptionbased TMS is correct, and thus also inherits the AEL semantics We argue that more work is needed to come to a better understanding of backtracking routines and so-called nogood inferences, which are identified as sources of ungrounded conclusions. These results contribute to bridging the gap between theory and implementation in the field of nonmonotonic reasoning