D-ward: source-end defense against distributed denial-of-service attacks
Jelena Mirković, Mário Gerla, Peter L. Reiher · 2003
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are a grave and challenging problem. Perpetration requires little effort on the attacker's side, since a vast number of insecure machines provides fertile ground for attack zombies, and automated scripts for exploit and attack can easily be downloaded and deployed. On the other hand, prevention of the attack or the response and traceback of perpetrators is extremely difficult due to a large number of attacking machines, the use of source-address spoofing and the similarity between legitimate and attack traffic. Many defense systems have been designed in the research and commercial communities to counter DDoS attacks, yet the problem remains largely unsolved. This thesis explores the problem of DDoS defense from two directions: (1) it strives to understand the origin of the problem and all its variations, and provides a survey of existing solutions, and (2) it presents the design (and implementation) of a source-end DDoS defense system called D-WARD that prevents outgoing attacks from deploying networks. Source-end defense is not the complete solution to DDoS attacks, since networks that do not deploy the proposed defense can still perform successful attacks. However, this thesis shows that a source-end defense (implemented in the D-WARD system) can detect and prevent a significant number of DDoS attacks, does not incur significant cost for its operation, and offers good service to legitimate traffic during the attack. By performing successful differentiation between legitimate and attack traffic close to the source, sour...