On behavior strategy solutions of finite two- person constant-sum extended games
R.L. Kashyap, Victor A. Utgoff · NASA STI Repository (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) · 1970
Through rhe intraduetfon of a concept called recall-sensitfvity, i o i s ~~~o ~a t ~~~e ~ bha% perfect recall (each player remembers all of i t s past actions and past knowledge of the ocher player's and nature's actions) is a aufficienp: but not a necesswy condition fax the existence of behavior strategy solutions and &-SolUtfOn8 in finite twoperson constant-sum extended games, A method is presented by which behavior s t r a t e g i e s meeting 8 aecaasary condition for eolutions ogh:-solutions may be generated, Coments are made on the practical implications of the material presented, L O Introduction Consider the three basic types of strategies t h a t may be by the players i n 8 f i n i t e two-person constant-sum extended game9 specifically, pure?strategies, mnixed strategies, and behavior s%ra%egies, ff we define the solution of such a game t o be any set of' strategies such that each player's strategy guarantees it the value of the game, we can make the foUarSng statements regarding these strategy t y p e s .( 5 ) I n sane games, pwle strategy solutions, which are the simplest t o store and implement, will not exist.( i i ) In mry game, a mixed strategy sohatian will exist, but it may be vastly more complicated t o store and !brplement than a pure strategy.( i i i ) I n many games, behavior strategy solutions, which are