APALLS: A Secure MANET Routing Protocol
Sivakumar Kulasekaran, Mahalingam Ramkumar · InTech eBooks · 2011
1. Non-repudiable authentication, while necessary, is not sufficient for obtaining non-repudiable proof of misbehavior.While the importance of non repudiable authentication is well understood (Sanzgiri et al., 2002), (Sun et al., 2007), investigation of issues in obtaining non repudiable proof of misbehavior (in the context of adhering to a MANET routing protocol) has not received attention thus far.To our knowledge, APALLS is the first protocol which addresses this issue.2. Protocols that focus on monitoring strategies (Marti et al., 2000)-(Marshall et .al, 2003) have predominantly ignored the relevance of cryptographic authentication.Likewise, protocols that focus on cryptographic authentication ignore strategies for monitoring.Comprehensive routing protocols should productively employ both.3. While many key distribution strategies have been proposed for ad hoc networks, they have not considered realistic network models.The choice of schemes in APALLS are driven by realistic models for large scale MANET deployments.APALLS 2 borrows some features from Ariadne (Hu et al., 2005), a popular secure extension of DSR.Ariadne does not prescribe strategies for monitoring, and consequently, does not possess mechanisms to address passive attacks involving selective participation.The cryptographic authentication strategies in Ariadne permit the source or destination to detect inconsistencies 1 While a packet signed by a node B can be used by A to demonstrate that B violated the protocol, it is arguably infeasible for a node A prove to some third party that B did not forward a RREQ/RREP.2 Ariadne with Pairwise Authentication and Link Layer Signatures.