ID-based one-pass authenticated key establishment
M. Choudary Gorantla, Colin Boyd, Juan Manuel González Nieto · 2008
One-pass authenticated key establishment (AKE) protocols are arguably better suited to the ID-based environment than their two-pass counterparts. However, there is no ID-based one-pass AKE protocol proposed in the literature with a proof of security in an appropriate model. This paper addresses the current gap by proposing a new ID-based one-pass AKE protocol and proving it secure in a formal model. The security of the new protocol is treated under a model adapted from a formal security model for traditional certificate based AKE protocols. The proof of security is in the random oracle model and is based on the hardness of the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. The protocol also turns out to be the most efficient of all the previously known protocols. It can work over a class of asymmetric pairings for better efficiency at higher bit security levels.