Game-Theoretic Algorithms for Optimal Network Security Hardening Using Attack Graphs
Karel Durkota, Viliam Lisý, Chris Kiekintveld, Branislav Bošanský · 2015
In network security hardening a network administrator may need to use limited resources (such as honeypots) to harden a network against possible attacks. Attack graphs are a common formal model used to represent possible attacks. However, most existing works on attack graphs do not con-sider the reactions of attackers to different defender strate-gies. We introduce a game-theoretic model of the joint prob-lem where attacker’s strategies are represented using attack graphs, and defender’s strategies are represented as modifi-cations of the attack graph. The attack graphs we use allow for sequential attack actions with associated costs and prob-abilities of success/failure. We present an algorithm for an computing attack policy that maximizes attacker’s expected reward and empirical results demonstrating our methods on a case study network.